Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

State of Utah v. Kory Sullivan : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald J. Yengich; Yengich, Rich & Xaiz; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Attorney General;
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Kory Sullivan, No. 20050978 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6106

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

;
)
])

vs.

]

KORY SULLIVAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
]
]>

APPELLANTS' OPENING
BRIEF

Case No. 20050978-CA
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

APPELLANT'S APPEAL FROM THE CONVICTION ENTERED AFTER
A JURY TRIAL ON JANUARY 11,2005, AND FROM THE JUDGMENT
AND SENTENCE ENTERED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 26,2005, IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JUDGE JUDITH
ATHERTON PRESIDING.
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
J. FREDERICK VOROS JR.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
KORY SULLIVAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

]
)
]>
]
)
;
))

APPELLANTS' OPENING
BRIEF

Case No. 20050978-CA
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

APPELLANT'S APPEAL FROM THE CONVICTION ENTERED AFTER
A JURY TRIAL ON JANUARY 11,2005, AND FROM THE JUDGMENT
AND SENTENCE ENTERED ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER 26,2005, IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE JUDGE JUDITH
ATHERTON PRESIDING.
RONALD J. YENGICH #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
J. FREDERICK VOROS JR.
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South
Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

LIST OF PARTIES IN THE COURT BELOW
The following is a complete list of the parties in the proceedings before the Third
Judicial District Court: The Honorable Judith Atherton presided over the instant case, the
State of Utah was represented by Assistant District Attorney Anne Cameron, Kory
Sullivan, the Appellant herein, was represented through trial by Steven Payton and at
sentencing by Ronald J. Yengich.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the judgment and conviction concerning Kory Sullivan
(hereinafter "Appellant") for Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103. (Add. II; Tr. at 190).1
This Court obtains jurisdiction to hear this appeal of a criminal case involving a
second degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

References to the attached Addenda shall hereinafter be cited as Add. [page number].
References to the trial transcript, recording the proceedings of January 11, 2005, which is
part of the record of the trial court, shall be cited as Tr. [page number].

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
/.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant the opportunity to
cross-examine witnesses regarding a civil suit filed by the victim,
which evidenced bias and included factual claims inconsistent with
trial testimony.

"Our standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex, since
the determination of admissibility 'often contains a number of rulings, each of which may
require a different standard of review.'" Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of
Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8, 38 (1999). This Court reviews the legal questions to
make the determination of admissibility for correctness. Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977,
979 (Utah 1993). We review the questions of fact for clear error. State v. Parker, 2000
UT 51, lfl| 13, 4 P.3d 778. Finally, we review the district court's ruling on admissibility
for abuse of discretion. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, fflf 10, 94 P.3d
193." State v. Workman, —P.3d—, 2005 WL 2429413 (Utah 2005).
This issue was preserved where Defense Counsel began to question witnesses
regarding the inconsistent statements made in civil pleadings and where the trial court
disallowed such a line of questioning. (Tr. At 74-76; 140; 180).

2

II.

Whether reversal is warranted where the prosecution failed to
provide the defense with an exculpatory photograph indicating that
the injury may have been caused by another party as well as a copy
of a video of witness interviews.

Whether the State's failure to provide items of discovery violates the rules and
rights described and set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny
is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. See e.g. Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123
(Utah 2005).
This issue was preserved through Defense Counsel's specific objection raised just
before trial proceedings began. (Tr. at 42-43).

Ill

Whether the trial court committed reversible error where it failed to
strike two jurors for cause, one of whom had been raped a mere ten
days earlier while the other had been the victim of an assault.

Whether a trial court erred in failing to exclude jurors for cause and whether such
error prejudiced a defendant are questions of law that should be reviewed de novo. See
State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1997).
This issue was preserved where the district court refused to grant Appellant's
motions to strike two jurors for cause. (Tr. at 14-18).

3

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are referred to
in Appellants' brief and are reproduced at Addendum I: Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
An Information filed on or about May 6, 2003, charged Appellant as follows:

Count I, Aggravated Assault, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-103; and Count II, Interfering With a Legal Arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305. (Add. II).

B.

Course of Proceedings
Count II, Interfering With a Legal Arrest, was dismissed following the preliminary

hearing in this case. A jury trial regarding Count I was held on January 11, 2006.(Tr. at 2)
C.

Disposition in Trial Court
Appellant was convicted of one count of Aggravated Assault, a second degree

felony, after having been found guilty by a jury on January 11, 2005. He was sentenced
on September 26, 2005, to a prison term of one to fifteen years in the custody of the
4

Board of Pardons. However, this prison term was suspended and Appellant was placed
on probation for 36 months under the following conditions: he was ordered to serve 180
days in jail, he was ordered to pay a fine of $2,000 including the applicable surcharge,
and he was ordered to comply with the usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult
Probation and Parole. Appellant was sentenced in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton presiding. He is no
longer incarcerated. (Add. II).

D.

Statement of Material Facts
On January 11, 2005, a jury trial was held in the above referenced matter before

the Honorable Judith Atherton. The State was represented by Anne Cameron, Deputy
Salt Lake District Attorney. Appellant was represented by his attorney, Steven Payton.
Prior to trial, Mr. Payton moved for a continuance for medical reasons. It appears that, at
the time of trial, he was under the care of an orthopedic surgeon and did not feel that he
could adequately go forward. (Jury Trial Transcript at 46:03-09). Mr. Payton indicated
that his left hand had been crushed in an accident and he was currently participating in
physical therapy twice a week and was taking anti-inflammatory medication. (Tr. at
46:08-09).

Mr. Payton requested a six-week delay for medical reasons; however,
5

nonetheless, the court denied Mr. Payton's motion to continue and the trial went forward
as scheduled. (Tr. at 45:05).
During jury selection, the defense moved to strike two jurors for cause. (Tr. at
28:19; 40:23-32:03). When the court asked the jury pool whether any members of their
close families or friends had been victims of a crime, seven jurors responded
affirmatively. (Tr. at 14:13-18:06). Specifically, Mr. Kennedy and Ms. Johnson both
indicated that they had been victims of physical abuse. (Tr. at 14:15-15:03; 17:19-18:06).
Mr. Kennedy stated that he was the victim of a physical altercation that occurred during a
University of Utah football game several years ago. (Tr. at 17:20). Ms. Johnson stated
that she had been the victim of a rape, just ten days prior, and that she had begun pressing
charges against the individual.

(Tr. at 14:22).

Both jurors indicated that their

experiences would not affect their ability to serve on the jury. (Tr. at 15:3; 18:6). The
court denied both motions to strike for cause; however neither juror served on the
empanelled jury. (Tr. at 35:20; 41:12; 41:24-25). In selecting the jury, the defense
exhausted all of its peremptory challenges and used these challenges to remove the two
jurors at issue.
Before the jury was sworn and opening statements were given, Mr. Payton made a
record as to various evidentiary issues and objections. (Tr. at 42:09-20). Specifically, in
6

one of his interviews, Detective Parks referenced a photograph which showed that the
victim had a shoe print on his face; Mr. Payton indicated that such evidence would be
exculpating as no witness intimated that Appellant ever kicked the victim. (Tr. at 42:0920; 43:10-16). Ms. Cameron stated that the she did not have such a photograph in her
possession. (Tr. at 43:22). In addition, she said that she did not intend to use any such
photograph during the trial. (Tr. at 43:07). The court decided to move forward with the
trial because Ms. Cameron had indicated she would not be using the photograph. (Tr. at
43:06).
Secondly, Mr. Payton told the court that the State had failed to produce a copy of a
videotaped interview with the victim's sister. (Tr. at 44:02-05). Reports showed that on
March 31, 2003, Detective Park met with Crystal, the victim's sister, and did an audio
and videotape interview with her; the defense was never provided with a copy of this
interview. (Tr. at 44:02-05).
Ms. Cameron blamed the failure to produce this interview on Mr. Payton's
untimely request for the material. (Tr. at 44:16-18). "My office received Mr. Payton's
request for videotapes, audio tapes and all other types of discovery evidence on the 5th of
January, which was last Wednesday." (Tr. at 44:16-18). Ms. Cameron indicated that the

7

videotape "might possibly be in the mail and be being sent to him;" however, Mr. Payton
had not received the videotape as of trial. (Tr. at 44:20; 45:10).
Judge Atherton subsequently reprimanded Mr. Payton for filing his discovery
motion so late. (Tr. at 45:13-23). Specifically, the court recognized that Mr. Payton filed
his appearance of counsel on March 8, 2004, the matter has been set for jury trial on two
occasions, but, nonetheless, Mr. Payton did not file a motion for discovery throughout the
entire process until just days before trial. (Tr. at 16-19). "It's inconceivable to me really
that a request for discovery comes in four days before trial and you've been involved in
this case for about 16 months." (Tr. at 21-23).

Eventually, Mr. Payton agreed to

proceed with the trial. (Tr. at 46:21-23).
During trial, Ms. Phyllis Khoury testified on behalf of the State. (Tr. at 53:20).
Ms. Khoury testified that she was the general manager of Dimitri's on the night in
question.

(Tr. at 55:24).

She was standing at the door when several customers

approached her as they were leaving and complained about three patrons, the Sullivan
brothers. (Tr. at 56:17). As Ms. Khoury approached the Sullivan brothers, she saw
Appellant push Brian, his brother, into Ian Walston. (Tr. at 61:24-62:09). She stepped in
between them. (Tr. at 57:10-11). Khoury testified that, shortly thereafter, Appellant
pushed her and then "came over [her] shoulder with a flying punch" and immediately
8

made contact with Mr. Walston's jaw. (Tr. at 57:15-16; 64:05-06). The punch knocked
Mr. Walston unconscious. (Tr. at 64:10). Ms. Khoury immediately left the scene to
telephone the paramedics and the sheriffs department. (Tr. at 64:22-24).
On cross examination, Mr. Payton attempted to illustrate the many inconsistencies
between Ms. Khoury's statements to Detective Park on April 1, 2003, and her statements
made during her direct examination. (Tr. at 68:19-21; 70:07-09; 78:20). Mr. Payton
began to question Ms. Khoury about a civil suit that was filed against Dimitri's under the
auspice that Ms. Khoury had changed her testimony to better protect herself and Dimitri's
from civil liability. (Tr. at 75:08-13). The following dialogue occurred:
Mr. Payton: Mr. Walston has filed suit against your employer, isn't that
correct? (Tr. at 75:08-09).
Ms. Khoury: No he has not. (Tr. at 75:10).
Mr. Payton: He hasn't filed suit against Dimitri's or you don't know? (Tr.
at 75:11-12).
Ms. Khoury: I don't know if he has or not. (Tr. at 75:13).
Mr. Payton: So your original statement, he has not, is not- (Tr. at 75:14).
Ms. Khoury: He has not to my knowledge but I do not know. (Tr. at
75:15).
Mr. Payton: Do you know if he's included you in that lawsuit? (Tr. at
75:16).
9

Ms. Cameron: Objection, asked and answered. (Tr. at 75:17).
Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 75:18).
Mr. Payton: And you've been contacted by civil counsel in connection
with giving your deposition in the litigation? (Tr. at 75:19-21).
Ms. Khoury: No, I have not. (Tr. at 75:22)
Mr. Payton: So you know nothing about any civil lawsuit that Mr. Walston
has filed. (Tr. at 75:23-24).
Ms. Khoury: No, I do not. (Tr. at 75:25).
Mr. Payton: And that's your testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:01).
Ms. Khoury: That's my testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:02).
Mr. Payton: Assuming with (inaudible) such a suit has in fact been filed,
do you- (Tr. at 76:03-04).
Ms. Cameron: Objection, Your Honor, this is so far outside the scope of
direct. It's entirely irrelevant. (Tr. at 76:05-06).
The Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 76:07).
As a result of the court's ruling, Mr. Payton was unable to further explore the civil
lawsuit or to illuminate to the jury the reasons that Ms. Khoury changed her story and her
potential biases to lie to insulate herself and the corporation from liability. (Tr. at 76:07).
Next, the State called Debbie Dixon to the stand. (Tr. at 80:12). Ms. Dixon
testified that she was a patron of the club on the night in question. (Tr. at 81:08-09). She
10

stated that Brian Sullivan bumped into the table where Mr. Walston was standing, and, as
a result, Mr. Walston exchanged words with him. (Tr. at 87:23-25). Mr. Walston then
crossed over the stage to the seating section of the club and picked up a chair. (Tr. at
89:05-17). Ms. Dixon testified that Mr. Walston picked the chair up off the ground about
two inches, then everyone began yelling, "No, no, put it down, put it down," implying
that the chair was lifted in an aggressive manner. (Tr. at 89:18-21). Subsequently, Mr.
Walston put the chair back on the ground. (Tr. at 89:21). After Mr. Walston put the
chair back down, Ms. Dixon testified that Appellant "came around the group and just
cocked back and just crunched [Mr. Walston]." (Tr. at 89:22-23). It appeared that Mr.
Walston was passed out for a short period of time and that he was bleeding from his
mouth. (Tr. at 91:01-07). Once the paramedics arrived, Ms. Dixon left the scene and
went outside for some fresh air. (Tr. at 91:21-25).
Finally, the State called Ian Walston to the stand. (Tr. at 107:09-10). Mr. Walston
testified that he had been drinking earlier that evening and he was feeling a little bit
"buzzed" at the time of the incident. (Tr. at 109:01-07). Mr. Walston testified that his
memory of the events was limited, but he remembered walking past the bar and
"accidentally [getting] caught up in [a fight]." (Tr. at 110:06-07). He stated that he
remembered being punched and then slapped him in the face by Matt Sullivan. (Tr. at
11

110:22-23; 111:12). Mr. Walston testified that the first punch hit him on his cheekbone
so hard that he saw white spots. (Tr. at 111:15-18). Mr. Walston turned to Matt Sullivan
and said, "What did I do to you? What's going on? I'm not part of this." (Tr. at 110:2425). Matt Sullivan just started swearing at Mr. Walston and said, "Fin going to kill you."
(Tr. at 113:04-05). A bouncer came to the scene and began holding Matt Sullivan back
from Mr. Walston. (Tr. at 113:17-19). At this point, Mr. Walston testified that he began
backing up and the next thing he remembered was waking up in an ambulance; he never
saw anyone hit him. (Tr. at 114:03). Mr. Walston testified that, as a result of the injuries
he sustained at Dimitri's, he was forced to undergo invasive surgery, his mouth was
wired shut for several months, he experienced severe pain, he has been diagnosed with
TMJ, and he has chronic problems with his bite. (Tr. at 116:18, 117:04; 118:10, 122:15).
Mr. Payton desired to cross examine Mr. Walston about inconsistent statements he
had made regarding his injuries. In his civil lawsuit complaint, Mr. Walston stated that
he was kicked repeatedly. (Tr. at 180:24). Mr. Payton desired to cross-examine Mr.
Walston about these statements; however, the court refused to allow this line of
questioning, or any reference to the civil lawsuit. (Tr. at 180:15).
The defense waived its right to put on evidence and proceeded with closing
arguments. Mr. Payton began his closing argument by quoting verses from The Bible.
12

(Tr. at 165:21-25). He proceeded to discuss various aspects of the case and to present a
factual argument for innocence; however, he also continually referred back to the Bible.
(Tr. at 175:20-24). At one point, he specifically admonished the jury to go check his
Bible verses and verify the content of what he proclaimed. (Tr. at 175:23).
The jury retired to deliberate for a short period of time, and, subsequently,
returned with a unanimous verdict. (Tr. at 178:25; 189:23). The jury's verdict found
Appellant guilty of Aggravated Assault. (Tr. at 190:08-09). Subsequently, Appellant
was sentenced on September 26, 2005, to a prison term of 1-15 years in the custody of
the Board of Pardons. However, this prison term was suspended and Appellant was
placed on probation for 36 months under the following conditions: he was ordered to
serve 180 days in jail, he was ordered to pay a fine of $2,000.00, and he was ordered to
comply with the usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and Parole.
Subsequently, he filed this appeal from the judgment, conviction and commitment that
was entered against him on September 26, 2005.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In the instant case, the State proceeded on the theory that Mr. Walston's injuries
were caused by a single strike by Appellant. However, the jury was disallowed the
opportunity to consider two key pieces of evidence that contradicted the State's theory in
13

this regard. The district court disallowed Appellant's trial counsel, Mr. Payton, from
exploring contradictory statements made Mr. Walston, who was one of the State's
primary witnesses. Mr. Walston had previously alleged, in a civil suit he filed against
Appellant and several others, that he had been punched and kicked numerous times by
several parties. This statement directly contradicted the testimony presented at trial and
the State's theory of the case. Nonetheless, the district court denied Appellant the
opportunity to explore the details and circumstances of this contradictory statement.
The foregoing error was compounded by the State's actions in failing to provide
Defendant with exculpatory evidence including a photograph that indicated that the
victim had been kicked. This evidence was exculpatory in that it also contradicted the
State's theory of the case: that Appellant caused the injuries at issue by a single strike.
This indicated that the injuries at issue were caused by another party and that the extent
of the injuries should not be attributed to Appellant. This distinction becomes especially
important where the extent of the injuries caused is an enumerated element of the offense
charged, second degree Aggravated Assault.

Where the State failed to provide

exculpatory evidence going to this element, and where the jury was otherwise prevented
from hearing pertinent evidence contradicting the State's theory of the case, reversal is
appropriate.
14

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENSE THE
OPPORTUNITY
TO
CROSS-EXAMINE
WITNESSES
REGARDING A CIVIL SUIT FILED BY THE VICTIM, WHICH
EVIDENCED BIAS AND INCLUDED FACTUAL CLAIMS
INCONSISTENT WITH TRIAL TESTIMONY.

In the instant case, where Appellant was charged with Aggravated Assault, a
second degree felony, the State was required to establish the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: that the defendant committed an assault as defined in Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-102, that the defendant caused a serious bodily injury thereby, and that the
defendant did so intentionally. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-103. In the instant case, Mr.
Payton desired to cross examine Mr. Walston about inconsistent statements he had made
regarding his injuries. In his civil lawsuit complaint, Mr. Walston stated that he was
kicked repeatedly by multiple parties. (Tr. at 180:24). Mr. Payton desired to crossexamine Mr. Walston about these statements; however, the trial court refused to allow
this line of questioning, or any reference to the civil lawsuit. (Tr. at 140, 180:15).
Similarly, when Mr. Payton began to question Ms. Khoury about the civil suit that
was filed against Dimitri's under the auspice that Ms. Khoury had changed her testimony
15

to better insulate herself and Dimitri's from civil liability.

(Tr. at 75:08-13). The

following dialogue occurred:
Mr. Payton: Mr. Walston has filed suit against your employer, isn't that
correct? (Tr. at 75:08-09).
Ms. Khoury: No he has not. (Tr. at 75:10).
Mr. Payton: He hasn't filed suit against Dimitri's or you don't know? (Tr.
at 75:11-12).
Ms. Khoury: I don't know if he has or not. (Tr. at 75:13).
Mr. Payton: So your original statement, he has not, is not- (Tr. at 75:14).
Ms. Khoury: He has not to my knowledge but I do not know. (Tr. at
.75:15).
Mr. Payton: Do you know if he's included you in that lawsuit? (Tr. at
75:16).
Ms. Cameron: Objection, asked and answered. (Tr. at 75:17).
Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 75:18).
Mr. Payton: And you've been contacted by civil counsel in connection
with giving your deposition in the litigation? (Tr. at 75:19-21).
Ms. Khoury: No, I have not. (Tr. at 75:22)
Mr. Payton: So you know nothing about any civil lawsuit that Mr. Walston
has filed. (Tr. at 75:23-24).
Ms. Khoury: No, I do not. (Tr. at 75:25).
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Mr. Payton: And that's your testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:01).
Ms. Khoury: That's my testimony today under oath. (Tr. at 76:02).
Mr. Payton: Assuming with (inaudible) such a suit has in fact been filed,
do you- (Tr. at 76:03-04).
Ms. Cameron: Objection, Your Honor, this is so far outside the scope of
direct. It's entirely irrelevant. (Tr. at 76:05-06).
The Court: Sustained. (Tr. at 76:07).
Consequently, the district court denied Appellant the opportunity to explore any
issues or facts regarding the civil lawsuit on the basis of relevance. However, the fact
that Mr. Walston filed a civil law suit against Appellant was relevant for several reasons
including the fact that it established witness bias and a motive to fabricate. Furthermore,
the civil pleading contained inconsistent statements and supported the argument that any
"serious bodily injury" was caused by a third party.
It is well established that the Sixth Amendment right allowing a defendant to
confront his accuser, as well as its counterpart under Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, must allow for a full and effective cross-examination into areas of witness
bias. Indeed under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, extrinsic evidence of bias is
expressly allowed to challenge a witness's credibility. Therefore, the State's argument
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that such evidence of bias exceeded the scope of direct and the district court's conclusion
that such matters were irrelevant were misplaced.
In State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986), the court held that it was error for
the trial court to deny a defendant the opportunity to enter into a full cross-examination
regarding a civil action filed by the victim, which evinced bias and a motive to fabricate.
The court reasoned that "Although the trial court has discretion in limiting crossexamination, this Court has been careful to allow wide latitude for examination in the
areas of bias and motive." Id. at 499.
In Rammel, the court held that the failure to allow for cross-examination into the
substance of the civil suit constituted error. However, the court further held that, given
the circumstances of that case, the error was harmless because the evidence before the
jury otherwise informed them as to the basis for bias and motive to fabricate. Granted,
"Courts have found no prejudice where information that may be brought out by further
questioning was already before the jury either from the testimony of others or by
implication from the witness9 own testimony." Id.; quoting State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d
1386, 1388 (Utah 1977). In Rammel, the implication from the witness5 testimony was
that a civil suit was filed and that there was a basis for bias or motive to fabricate. In
contrast, in this case, the implication from the allowed testimony was that no civil law
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suit was filed. Where Ms. Khoury testified that she had no knowledge of a civil case,
even though she was the manager of the establishment, the jury was left with the
impression that no civil suit was filed. By denying Appellant any opportunity to correct
this misconception during the cross-examination of Mr. Walston, the trial court allowed
the jury to proceed under this continued misconception. Therefore, where the jury in
Rammel was otherwise provided the information going to bias, the jury in the case at bar
was not. Consequently, where the error may have been harmless in Rammel, Appellant's
substantial rights were implicated by the error in this case. Consequently, where the trial
court's error implicated the substantial rights of the accused, reversal is warranted in the
instant case.

II.

REVERSAL IS WARRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE WHERE
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVIDE THE DEFENSE
WITH AN EXCULPATORY PHOTOGRAPH INDICATING
THAT THE INJURY MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY
ANOTHER PARTY.

It is well accepted that due process generally prevents the Government from
suppressing evidence favorable to the accused, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). As the Supreme Court
explained in Brady, due process requires the production of evidence which is materially
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favorable to the accused, either as direct or impeaching evidence. Williams v. Button,
400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968) cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1105; Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). This requirement encompasses
information bearing upon the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses. Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a
given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible
interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's
life or liberty may depend.
Napue v. Illinois, supra, at 269. Other courts have concluded that the trial court's
supervisory power to safeguard the correct administration of justice in the courts
reinforces this disclosure requirement. See e.g. United States v. Consolidated Laundries
Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571 (2nd Cir. 1961); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 835, 832 (2nd
Cir. 1969); see generally Communist Party of the United States v. S.A.C.B., 351 U.S. 115,
124(1956).
Furthermore, the disclosure of information impeaching the credibility of witnesses
must be accomplished early so as to accommodate the effective preparation for trial.
United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 578 (2nd Cir. 1969); United States v. Baxter, 492
F.2d 150, 173-174 (9th Cir. 1973); cert, denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974).
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Disclosure by the government must be made at such a time as
to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively
in the preparation and presentation of its case, even if
satisfaction of this criterion requires pretrial disclosure.
United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 924.
Courts have accorded this right to pretrial disclosure such weight that, even when the
favorable information takes the form of a witness statement otherwise protected from
pretrial discovery by the Jencks Act (19 U.S.C. §3500), the prosecution must nonetheless
disclose it as early as practically required for the defense to make fair use of it. See E.g.,
United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 270-71, (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v.
Houston, 339 F.Supp. 762 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Eley, 335 F.Supp. 353, 358
(N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Gleason, 265 F.Supp. 880, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972). Compare United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1979).
In the instant case, before the jury was sworn and opening statements were given,
Mr. Payton made a record as to various evidentiary issues and objections. (Tr. at 42:0920). Specifically, in one of his interviews, Detective Parks referred to a photograph
which showed that the victim had a shoe print on his face; Mr. Payton indicated that such
evidence would be exculpating as no witness intimated that Defendant ever kicked the
victim. (Tr. at 42:09-20; 43:10-16). Ms. Cameron stated that the she did not have such a
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photograph in her possession. (Tr. at 43:22). In addition, she said that she did not intend
to use any such photograph during the trial. (Tr. at 43:07). The court decided to move
forward with the trial because Ms. Cameron had indicated she would not be using the
photograph. (Tr. at 43:06).
The defense specifically pointed out that the importance of the missing photograph
was not that it might be used by the State to support its case but that it constituted
exculpatory evidence favorable to the defense.

Nonetheless, the Court overruled

Appellant's objection on the basis that the State would not be introducing it.
Photographs showing boot prints on the victim's body and face were exculpatory
in that they indicated that any "serious bodily injury" sustained by Mr. Walston was not
caused by Appellant's actions. Witnesses only ever stated that Appellant struck Mr.
Walston once with his fist.

Photographs showing that Mr. Walston was kicked

repeatedly indicate that Appellant did not cause the serious bodily injury that may have
been sustained.

Again, as this is an express element of the crime charged, the

photographs would have served an exculpatory purpose.
As stated previously, it made no difference as to whether the prosecution acted in
good or bad faith. Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123, 1131 (Utah 2005). Furthermore,
"[t]he duty to disclose favorable evidence is implicated even if the evidence is known
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only to police investigators and not the prosecutor." Id. citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 438 (1995). Consequently, the State's assertion that it did not have the exculpatory
photographs in its possession was irrelevant where an officer's report specifically
referred to the photographs.

Furthermore, the State's duty to disclose exculpatory

evidence attaches "regardless of whether the evidence has been requested by the
accused."

Id. citing United States v. Agurs, All U.S. 97 (1976).

Therefore, any

questions as to the timing of Mr. Payton's request for discovery are similarly of no
moment.
In the instant case, exculpatory photographs were in the possession of either the
State or its investigators.

These photographs were not given to the defense either

intentionally or through inadvertence. Nonetheless, the failure of the State to provide the
defense with this exculpatory evidence implicated Appellant's right to Due Process and
reversal is appropriate as a result.

III.

A NEW TRIAL IS WARRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE
WHERE THE COURT FAILED TO STRIKE TWO JURORS FOR
CAUSE, ONE OF WHOM HAD BEEN RAPED A MERE TEN
DAYS EARLIER WHILE THE OTHER HAD BEEN THE
VICTIM OF AN ASSAULT.
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During jury selection in the instant case, the defense moved to strike two jurors for
cause. (Tr. at 28:19; 40:23-32:03). When the court asked the jury pool whether any of
their close families or friends had been victims of a crime, seven jurors responded
affirmatively. (Tr. at 14:13-18:06). Specifically, Mr. Kennedy and Ms. Johnson both
indicated that they had been victims of physical abuse. (Tr. at 14:15-15:03; 17:19-18:06).
Mr. Kennedy stated that he was the victim of a physical altercation that occurred during a
University of Utah football game several years ago. (Tr. at 17:20). Ms. Johnson stated
that she had been the victim of a rape, just ten days prior, and that she had begun pressing
charges against the individual.

(Tr. at 14:22).

Both jurors indicated that their

experiences would not affect their ability to serve on the jury. (Tr. at 15:3; 18:6). The
court denied both motions to strike for cause; however neither juror served on the
empaneled jury.

(Tr. at 35:20; 41:12; 41:24-25). In selecting the jury, the defense

exhausted all of its peremptory challenges and used these challenges to remove the two
jurors at issue.
Where the instant case involved allegations of an assault, it was improper to
permit two victims of similar crimes to sit on the jury. Particularly in the case of Ms.
Johnson, who was the victim of a very recent rape, impartiality could not be rehabilitated.
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Where a potential juror is the recent victim of a similar crime, a challenge for-cause
should be granted.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(d) establishes the right to peremptory
challenges and provides in pertinent part: "A peremptory challenge is an objection to a
juror for which no reason need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to ten
peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory
challenges." For many years, the pertinent rule, when addressing the improper denial of
a motion to strike a juror for cause, was as follows: "reversal is required whenever a party
is compelled 'to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a panel member who should
have been stricken for cause/ " Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975).
However, Crawford fs automatic reversal rule was reversed in favor of "the
approach utilized by a majority of the states and upheld by the federal courts." State v.
Menzies^ 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).

Under Menzies, a defendant waives error by

exercising peremptories to achieve an impartial jury. As the authorities embraced in
Menzies explain, "So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had
to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the [Constitution] was
violated." Ross, 487 U.S. at 88, 108 S.Ct. at 2278 (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 7
S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887)). Under Menzies, "[t]o prevail on a claim of error based
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on the failure to remove a juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz.,
show that a member of the jury was partial or incompetent." 889 P.2d at 398.
In the instant case, trial counsel used peremptory challenges to remove the two
jurors at issue. Therefore, the State will likely assert that the error in this instance was
not prejudicial.

Nonetheless, this Court can consider the cumulative error doctrine,

where a court will reverse a defendant's conviction if 'the cumulative effect of the
several errors undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had." Whitehead v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990); accord State v. Johnson,
784 P.2d 1135, 1146 (Utah 1989).
Appellant submits that the above argument, in conjunction with the trial court's
inappropriate and unconstitutional limitations on cross-examination regarding the civil
suit and the failure to order the production of exculpatory evidence cumulatively show
that Appellant's right to a fair trial was prejudiced.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse
conviction in this case and to remand the case to the district court for retrial.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel for Appellant requests oral argument in the above matter.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of April, 2006.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

By
RONALD J. YENGICH
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this
Frederick Voros Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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day of April, 2006, to:

ADDENDUM I

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-5-103
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*tilChapter 5. Offenses Against The Person
^iiPart 1. Assault and Related Offenses
•*§ 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 . Aggravated assault

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection ( l ) ( a ) , uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection ( l ) ( a ) is a second degree felony.

(3) A violation of Subsection ( l ) ( b ) is a third degree felony.

ADDENDUM II

Nuv-io-duuo iut u ^ i a rn IHIKU uibiKlut UUUK1

hAX NO. 8015783809

P. 02/04

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031903035 FS

KORY MICHAEL SULLIVAN,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDITH S ATHERTON
September 26, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
sunshinb
Prosecutor: HALL, JEFFREY W
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) : YENGICH, RONALD J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: March 25, 1975
Video
Tape Count: 9:35
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
Plea: Not Guilty

2nd Degree Felony
• Disposition: 01/11/2005 Guilty

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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FAX NO. 8015783809

P. 03/04

Case NO: 031903035
Date:
Sep 26, 2005

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(a)
in the Salt Lake County Jail.
Credit is granted for time served.
Credit is granted for 2 day(s) previously Berved.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:
Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Tot al Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$2000.00
$0.00
$918.92
$2000.00
$2000.00
$0
$918.92
$2000.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail.
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail.
Defendant is to report by October 4, 2005 by 9:00 p.m..
Defendant is to pay a fine of 2000.00 which includes the surcharge.
Interest may increase the final amount due.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
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FAX NO. 8015783809

P. 04/04

Case No: 031903035
Date:
Sep 26, 2005
Submit t o t e s t s of b r e a t h and u r i n e upon t h e r e q u e s t of any Law
Enforcement O f f i c e r .
V i o l a t e no l a w s .
Enter, p a r t i c i p a t e i n , and complete any program, c o u n s e l i n g , or
treatment as d i r e c t e d by t h e Department of Adult P r o b a t i o n and
Parole.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Court ordered no contact with victim.
Comply with A/D clauses per AP&P, Defendant not to go to Bars or
Clubs, have a Substance Abuse and Mental Health evaluation and any
recommended treatment per AP&P, Pay full restitutio
Dated this /(Q day of ^o4fVV\fojPy^

JUDITH S A'
District
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ADDENDUM III

RONALD J. YENG1CH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XA1Z
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-0320
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,

:

vs.
Case No. 031903035
KORY M. SULLIVAN,
Defendant.

: JUDGE JUDITH ATHERTON

Defendant/Appellant, Kory Sullivan, by and through his attorney of record, Ronald J.
Yengich, hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal several of this Honorable Court's rulings in
the above captioned case. This Notice of Appeal in no way limits or waives Defendant's right to
appeal any otherfindingsor orders not specifically included herein. The Defendant is the party
taking the instant appeal. The appeal will be taken from the Third District Court, the Honorable
Judith Atherton presiding. The instant appeal will be taken to the Utah Court Of Appeals. The
following issues and orders may be raised on appeal: Defendant will appeal this Court's denial of
Defendant's Notice and Objection to Information Defects, which wasfiledon January 4, 2005;
Defendant will appeal this Court's denial of his Motion to Continuefiledshortly before trial on
the basis that prior counsel needed additional time to adequately prepare for trial so as to secure
Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel; Defendant will appeal

his ultimate conviction for Aggravated Assault, including but not limited to whether sufficient
evidence was presented at trial to substantiate the jury's guilty verdict, whether Defendant
received the effective assistance of counsel and other trial issues that may become apparent once
the trial transcript is fully reviewed. Defendant reserves therightto challenge any other finding
or order issued in relation to this case and/or the associated conviction.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j^Oday of October, 2005.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal, this 3 ^ day of October, 2005, to the following:

District Attorney's Office
1 \ 1 East Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Court Reporter for Judge Atherton
Carolyn Erickson
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
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